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The conventional macroeconomic policy framework, with its focus on maintaining 
macro stability is inadequate for the purpose of accelerating the structural 
transformation of African economies. This ‘policy position’ paper explores an 
alternative framework, wherein macroeconomic policies are applied coherently 
to one another and in coordination with other policies, and a resolution of the 
short-run trade-off between the macroeconomic policy objectives of stabilisation 
and development is sought in terms of a long-term development approach for 
enhancing both aggregate demand and supply capacity as an anchor for navigating 
a path towards structural transformation. After presenting a working definition of 
structural transformation, the paper presents the core elements of such a 
framework and discusses the corresponding policy agenda under five headings. 
Using this agenda as a benchmark, it discusses how to approach the debates on fiscal, 
monetary and financial policies, avoiding the limitations of standard macroeconomic 
literature, in order to make those policies conducive to Africa’s structural 
transformation. 
 
Key Words: Structural Transformation, Macroeconomic Frameworks, African 
Development, Fiscal Sustainability and Legitimacy, Monetary and Financial Policy for 
Development  
JEL Code: O21, O23, O25,O43, O55 
 
* Emeritus Professor of Economics, School of Oriental and African Studies, 
mn2@soas.ac.uk.  The paper is initially built on one part of my background paper 
written for the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), “ Macroeconomic 
Framework for Structural Transformation of African Economies”. However, the 
arguments and analyses presented in this paper reflect my refined, updated thoughts on 
the subject since then, hence they are substantially different in several critical aspects 
from those appeared in my earlier paper (Nissanke, 2014). 
 
  
This is the accepted version of an article that has been published by Elsevier in Structural Change and 
Economic Dynamics on 18 Aug 2018. Published version available from: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2018.07.005 
Accepted version made available under CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International License from SOAS Research 
Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/26304/  




1. Introduction  
 
While structural change is conventionally discussed in terms of sectoral compositional 
changes in output, or employment, a deeper understanding of transformational 
processes is required for strategic policy making, which goes well beyond a mere linear 
progression from a primary-sector dominant structure towards a higher order one. A 
number of recent studies shed a light on the process of structural transformation. For 
example, McMillan and Rodrik (2011) argue that structural transformation should be 
understood as the growth-enhancing structural change resulting from reallocation of 
resources from low-productivity activities to high-productivity ones across, and within, 
sectors.  Their empirical analysis covering the period of 1990-2005 shows that whilst 
Asian countries have experienced productivity-enhancing structural changes, 
productivity-reducing structural changes have been a norm in Africa and Latin 
America. 1 Extending an analysis to a longer period between 1960 and 2000, de Vries 
et al. (2013) further reveal that Africa’s relative productivity in relation to the global 
technological frontier has steadily declined across sectors since the 1980s, and Africa’s 
structural change since the 1990s has been characterised by ‘static gains’ but 
accompanied by ‘dynamic losses’ as labour migrated from both agriculture and 
manufacturing to fragile informal activities in services with lower marginal 
productivity.   
 
Emerging consensus indicate that: 1) structural transformation should be associated 
with overall labour productivity growth and a move into sectors with dynamic growth 
potentials; 2) productivity-enhancing structural change cannot be expected on the basis 
of fragile activities regardless of the sectors. Clearly, economies with comparative 
advantage in natural resources and primary commodity exports are at a disadvantage 
compared to those with one in human resources and manufacturing goods exports.  
Countries in Africa and Latin America have failed to get the process of productivity-
enhancing structural change underway while increasingly integrating into the world 
economy as globalisation has gathered pace since the early 1990s. 
 
The pattern of productivity-reducing change in Africa since the mid-1970s is a direct 
consequence of the extreme paucity of productive investments in both public and 
private sectors, manifesting itself in a halt to the process of socio-economic 
development. In the normal development process, fragile informal activities are 
expected to build up productive assets and capacities so as to graduate into more robust, 
formal units. Instead, fragile informal activities remain the mainstay of African 
economies today, as the reverse process of informalisation has taken place. Without 
rigorous productivity-enhancing investment and skill-technology-knowledge 
acquisition into new dynamically evolving sectors, Africa’s ‘revealed’ comparative 
advantage remained static in pre-existing relative resource endowments and it has 
dominated its integration pattern into the global economy.  
                                                        
1 Their more recent work (McMillan et. al, 2014) suggests some early sign of productivity-enhancing 
changes in Africa since 2005.   
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Structural transformation envisaged in Africa should address these weak conditions 
associated with ‘enclave’ and ‘fragmented’ economic structures as well as with the 
fragility and vulnerability characterizing informal activities, requiring a strategic 
approach. Yet, whilst Africa’s imperative for structural transformation is now widely 
acknowledged2, there is little agreement on what constitutes an appropriate set of 
economic policies that are conducive to structural transformation. The conventional 
macroeconomic policy discourse, with its exclusive focus on maintaining macro 
stability under the banner of ensuring “sound macro fundamentals” is grossly 
inadequate in accelerating the pace of structural transformation, or even triggering the 
transformation process in its earnest. 
It is critical to seek a fresh approach to macroeconomic management so as to to fit the 
purpose of structural transformation of African economies.3 Against this background, 
the prime objective of this paper is to explore an alternative framework wherein 
macroeconomic policy tools are applied coherent to one another and in coordination 
with other policies, and a resolution of the short-run trade-off between the two 
macroeconomic policy objectives- stabilisation and development- is sought with a clear 
long-term development vision as an anchor for navigating a path towards structural 
transformation.4 The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 after providing our 
working definition of structural transformation, we first present an overarching 
macroeconomic framework and its core constructs for facilitating developmental 
processes towards structural transformation. This is followed by discussion on five 
cross-cutting agenda to be addressed by macroeconomic policies located in the 
framework. Using these five agenda as a benchmark, Section 3 discusses how to 
reconstruct the debates on fiscal and monetary policies from the confined discourses 
prevailing in mainstream macroeconomics literature. Section 4 presents concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Macroeconomic Framework and Cross Cutting Policy Agenda for Facilitating 
the Process of Structural Transformation 
 
2. 1. A Quest for an overarching Macroeconomic Framework  
 
Macroeconomic policies derived from the Keynes’ General Theory were very much 
focused on the mission of maintaining aggregate demand through economic cycles. 
Macroeconomic models subsequently developed were built around the promise that 
there exists an inherent tension and trade-off between the two objectives – stabilisation 
and growth – in the short run, while the two objectives can be complementary in the 
long run. Macroeconomic management was understood as treading carefully this short-
run trade off. However, as discussed below, there has been an increasing tendency to 
                                                        
2 . See, for example, African Development Bank (2017).  
3 . Africa and sub-Saharan Africa are used interchangeably throughout, and this paper does not cover 
countries in North Africa. 
4 . Given this objective, this paper is written as an exploratory policy position piece with reference to 
relevant theory debates, not reporting results of empirical work or theoretical model building 
exercises. 
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interpret the ‘stabilisation’ objective simply as achieving price stability in academic and 
policy discourses since the late 1970s, and macroeconomic policies are predominantly 
evaluated in terms of ensuring price stability.  
 
Whilst the singling out of price stability as the foremost objective is often rationalised 
in the discourses of developed economies under the assumption of a near-full 
employment economy5, this bias is unjustifiable for low-income countries with large 
reserves of unemployed resources to be utilised as productive assets. Such an exclusive 
focus on maintaining price stability under the banner of ensuring “sound macro 
fundamentals” is grossly inadequate for facilitating structural transformation of African 
economies. Clearly, their macroeconomic policy performance should be also evaluated 
in relation to development goals, and macroeconomic management should set both 
stabilisation and development as the main objectives.  
 
Now, structural transformation of African economies as envisioned in this paper goes 
far beyond simple sectoral compositional changes in output or employment. Instead, as 
illustrated in Figure 1, we argue for it to be understood as development processes 
involving changes in multiple dimensions of a socio-economic system, including its 
production matrix, social structure, institutional setting and its relationship with the 
natural environment. It is only through these multi-dimensional processes that countries 
could transit from ‘enclave’ and ‘fragmented’ structures characterised by the fragility 
and vulnerability associated with informal activities, towards a well-articulated 
economy, wherein economic activities are linked closely so that dynamic externalities 
and demand spillovers are generated to reinforce both static gains from resource 
reallocation across sectors and dynamic gains from technological advancement 
economy-wide. 
- Insert about here Figure 1- 
 
Furthermore, only by dynamically shifting from their static ‘revealed’ comparative 
advantage inherited from the colonial era through active ‘learning-by-doing’, could 
African countries strategically take advantage of emerging opportunities arising from 
integrating into the global economy and address challenges from new technology-
driven trade from a stronger position. A well-articulated economy with a diversified 
structure encompassing varieties of activities linked together could raise local demand 
in a self-sustaining manner on the basis of Africa’s demographic dividends and regional 
integration, instead of relying heavily on external demand outside Africa. The more 
reliance on enlarged home and regional markets with expanding aggregate demand 
presents a bigger potential of generating secure jobs and gainful employment, creative 
activities and learning opportunities on a continuous basis.6 Inclusive development 
should become then an integral part of these dynamic processes of structural 
                                                        
5 The Great Recession that followed the GFC of 2008 in advanced economies has led to a reappraisal 
of macroeconomic theory and policy, including a search for growth-oriented stabilisation policy (e.g. 
Stiglitz , 2014, Blanchard and Summers, 2017) .  See Sections 2.2 below for the recent debate on 
macroeconomic management. 
6 See Stiglitz and Greenwald (2014) for understanding development as a process of creating a ‘learning 
society’. 
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transformation. Structural transformation is an evolving process of not only 
transformation of economic structures but social transformation, proceeding with 
sharing opportunities ex-ante among all the population, inclusive of, poorer segments 
regardless of gender, ethnicity and religion or any other divisive criteria.7 
 
Clearly, the prevailing conditions in Africa today do pose severe challenge in initiating 
and sustaining the process of transformation of economic and social structures as 
outlined above. The reality on the ground is arduous on many fronts.  There are still 
massive deficits in three key areas – human resources, infrastructure, and institutional 
environments. Addressing them is exigent, since improving each of these areas 
constitutes an indispensable building block for proceeding to structural transformation 
and achieving the ultimate goals, as shown in Figure 1.  Initiating and accelerating such 
a transformation process needs a far-sighted strategic stance. It demands purposeful, 
concerted societal efforts to build productive capacity and assets economy-wide by 
directing public and private investment into new dynamic high-value added activities 
with high social returns in many decades ahead. Thus, to kick-start the process, 
incessant, large-scale investments in all aspects of human resources (education, health, 
skills and knowledge) as well as economic and social infrastructures are indispensable.  
 
Further, there are close interrelationships between institutional configurations and the 
quality of policy-making, which jointly determine development outcome through. 
multi-layer feedback loops in the institutions-policies-development nexus. Our 
institutions-policies-development triangular nexus implies that a country’s institutional 
configuration as evolved affects its government’s ability to formulate and implement 
development strategies, including macroeconomic policy-making. At the same time, 
the way these plans and policies are executed would influence institutional 
configuration and its evolution. Then, the combined effects of institutions and policies 
determine developmental outcome, which affect the subsequent evolution of 
institutions. Thus, as one of the main building blocks towards structural transformation, 
it is necessary to nurture an institutional configuration into developmental one, i.e. a 
developmental nation-state that is accountable to domestic stakeholders.  
 
With these tasks in mind, we call for a coherent framework, where individual 
macroeconomic policies - fiscal and monetary policies as well as financial and 
regulatory policies in the domain of a country’s Ministry of Finance and Central Bank 
- are placed and contextualised. The proposed framework is outlined schematically in 
Figure 2, in which the macroeconomic framework for structural transformation is 
embedded in an overarching development strategic plan, which maps a path towards 
long-term goals set in a country- and region-specific context. Fig.2 also illustrates 
macroeconomic policies should be executed in coordination with other policies. Whilst 
the importance of macroeconomic policies for providing overall policy environments 
is not in doubt, structural transformation as defined cannot be facilitated by 
macroeconomic policies alone or any individual policy in isolation. It requires the 
deployment of wide-ranging policies, including trade, technology policies, financial 
                                                        
7 . See Nissanke (2014, 2017a) for more detailed discussions on how structural transformation and 
inclusive development should be understood in the African context, as illustrated in Fig.1 
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sector policies, oversight regulatory and competition policies, social policy, education 
and health policies as well as sector-specific policies such as industrial or agricultural 
policies. Macroeconomic policies are tasked with providing pro-investment macro 
conditions, under which other policies can be executed in a manner that is consistent 
inter-temporarily and spatially with a view to facilitating structural transformation. 
 
- Insert about here Figure 2- 
 
Implementing these policies requires a system of endogenously evolved institutions as 
a country’s institutional configuration to navigate the process of structural 
transformation in a coordinated manner.8 In this regard, macroeconomic policy should 
be designed to be instrumental in laying an institutional foundation for structural 
transformation by fostering productive private-public interface that would give rise to 
an emergence of a developmental nation-state. Hence, the two-way interrelationships 
between policies and institutions are represented in arrows in the upper part of Fig.2. 
The proposed framework emphases the need for a holistic approach with a system of 
operational flexibility and coordination to take on the challenge of structural 
transformation, where a strategic plan is at its helm.9 The plan is to provide an anchor 
and a road map in taking strategic decisions on a rolling basis while navigating 
macroeconomic policies through the short-run trade-off between the twin objectives of 
stabilisation and development.  
 
Attending stabilisation needs without undermining development efforts has been a 
challenge to macroeconomic management in developing countries. Because of 
structural characteristics of their economies, Sub-Sahara African countries can be 
singled out as the region that have been susceptible to most hardships by the failure in 
addressing this ‘trade-off’ challenge throughout their post-independence years 
irrespective of the development paradigms adopted. Critically, the stabilisation policies 
applied were often flawed at its core for sustaining impetus for development.10 In the 
early post-independent years, their development processes were severely constrained 
despite planning in place largely due to the huge gap between the high vision and 
aspiration for socio-economic advancement embedded in their development plans, on 
the one hand, and the state capacity and institutional configurations for implementation 
on the grounds, on the other. Often than not, the way the state-led development model 
was adopted and executed, most domestic stakeholders -private firms and rural farmers 
alike- were largely left disenfranchised from economic development processes and 
collective efforts in nation-state-building.   
 
Unfortunately, before they had hardly time to build institutional resilience as a nation-
state, their development crusade was disrupted by difficulties in adjusting to 
                                                        
8  See Nissanke (2017a) for the concept of endogenously evolved institutions as a country’s 
institutional configuration. 
9  Such a plan is naturally not made up of a set of directives and targets in a particular time horizon, as 
in a typical centrally planned, command economy.     
10 See Nissanke (2014) for detailed discussions of the evolution of macroeconomic policy frameworks 
in Africa in the post independent period from this specific angle. 
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macroeconomic imbalances in the face of large external shocks in the 1970s. Many 
countries, which remained overly dependent on primary commodity export revenues 
for internal and external balances had to pay heavy prices for their external borrowing 
to ride-through the macroeconomic imbalances and subsequent pro-cyclical spending 
during the short-lived commodity boom of the 1970s. The boom was followed by the 
precipitous commodity price collapse at the close of the 1970s, which had led to the 
protracted sovereign debt crisis, a resolution of which was finally reached by the 
adoption of the MDRI only in 2005.11   
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, macroeconomic stabilisation-cum-adjustment objectives 
dominated over other developmental objectives.  The solutions recommended by the 
IFIs to debt crises were an adoption of policies of liberalisation and deregulation, and 
keeping the size of governments to a minimum in exchange for aid money and debt 
restructuring under the SAPs. In the deregulated environments emerged, there was no 
place for sectoral policies aiming at fostering selected economic activities or 
coordinating investments on the part of governments. The remaining role of 
governments in economic management judged as legitimate was strictly confined to 
maintaining macroeconomic balances through short-run stabilization policies as 
designed by the IMF.  
 
What is most disturbing is that incorrect stabilisation policies were applied, which did 
aggravate further the debt crisis in commodity-dependent low-income countries. These 
policies were pro-cyclical to exogenous shocks stemming from commodity price 
swings, rather than counter-cyclical as should be. As the application of the stabilisation 
policies that ignored the on-going commodity crisis further depressed the economies. 
The dwindling capacity to undertake public investments on the part of governments 
burdened with high debt resulted in their inability to promote and crowd-in private 
investment.  Thus, the stocks of productive assets were fast depleted for individuals as 
well as for the economies as large. 
 
In short, Africa’s past experiences with both the state-led development planning of the 
earlier years and the development guided by market forces only under the SAPs, each 
of which is derived from the contrasting paradigm respectively, did give rise to common 
conditions that are particularly detrimental to structural transformation. First there was 
little sustained productive public investment with a view to enticing private investment. 
Second, public goods provisions were very poor in terms of accessibility, as well as in 
the quality in provision of: i) hard economic infrastructures, i.e. access to reliable public 
services in power, transport, communication, water, sanitation and others; ii) social 
expenditures in health and education provision; and iii) soft infrastructures by ensuring 
public safety and security, reducing transaction and information costs through 
establishing a stable regulatory structure to exchanges and interactions economy-wide. 
 
                                                        
11  The outbreak of Africa’s debt crisis in the early 1980s was closely connected to that of the severe 
commodity crisis at the time. See Maizels (1992) and Nissanke (2010a) for a more detailed, 
exposition. For further discussion of the debt dynamics of the HIPCs, see Nissanke (2010b). 
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These two conditions are closely interrelated.  The macroeconomic frameworks under 
the previous regimes failed to create efficient and capable governments and public 
institutions to undertake pro-poor public investments on a sustained basis.  Weak public 
investment was the outcome of the fragile fiscal positions resulting from unstable, 
meagre financial resource bases combined with inadequate institutional capability 
(technical and organizational) at governments and public agencies. The remedies 
imposed by the IFIs aggravated the situation as they weakened the state capacity by 
starving governments off resources for public investment and services. Given little 
public investments undertaken and no guarantee of covering recurrent costs for 
operation and maintenance, most public services were unavailable or grossly 
inadequate in reliability and quality for domestic stakeholders. Such feeble fiscal 
positions led not only to the fast depletion of physical and human productive assets but 
also to an institutional low-equilibrium for development. Consequently, Africa’s 
critical bottlenecks in all three key areas - human resources, infrastructure provision, 
and institutional configurations - are enormous, and reducing them requires consistent 
and concerted efforts at all levels.  
 
A fresh approach to resolve the trade-off between the stabilisation and development 
objectives is needed. To date, stabilisation policies are implemented for closing 
macroeconomic imbalances fast in the name of restoring macro stability. In practice 
this is accomplished by depleting a country’s productive assets by reducing both 
aggregate demand and supply capacity with a severe setback to its developmental 
objective. Addressing the trade-off is particularly complicated for countries heavily 
dependent on primary commodity exports for their external and internal balances, since 
exogenous shocks from highly volatile cyclical commodity prices, rather than domestic 
demand conditions, are the prime cause for large swings in their macroeconomic 
balances. This crucial feature needs to be confronted upfront in formulating 
macroeconomic policies. Stabilisation policy should be designed and executed by 
making a correct diagnose of how macro imbalances emerge in the first place.12 If 
imbalances are triggered by external shocks, stabilisation should be applied counter-
cyclically to external shocks. For commodity dependent economies, stabilisation 
policies should be applied counter-cyclical to commodity price movements: an 
expansionary stance to stimulate aggregate demand in commodity price slumps, while 
taming overheating conditions in commodity booms. Yet, when a country is hit by 
negative external shocks, requiring stand-by loans from the IMF, it is compelled to 
deploy stabilisation policies to suppress demand for addressing perceived excess in 
aggregate domestic demand and thereby to reduce deficits in both accounts within a 
tight timeline specified in loan agreements. 
 
Drawing lessons from their bitter past experiences, many natural resource rich African 
countries attempted to apply stabilisation policies counter-cyclically over the recent 
                                                        
12 Ocampo and Ross (2006) also note that economic cycles of emerging and developing countries are 
driven by external shocks such as a dramatic shift in their terms of trade or cross-border private capital 
flows rather than those of domestic origin. With this mind, they call for policy space in 
macroeconomic policy.   
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commodity super cycle of 2002-2014.13  Their accumulated international reserves or 
savings lodged in Sovereign Wealth Funds or Stabilisation Funds established during 
the boom helped several countries to adopt stimulus packages to weather immediate 
negative impacts at the onset of the GFC of 2008-9. The continued availability of 
financial resources from non-traditional development partners and buoyant private 
capital flows at backdrop of the “Africa Rising” narratives also accorded resource-poor 
countries, especially frontier countries, a space to adopt counter-cyclical fiscal and 
monetary policy in the initial post Crisis period, while a number of fragile and post-
conflict countries lacked resources to implement such policies on their own. 14  
However, led by the dramatic fall of oil prices, the commodity price index across board 
has plummeted since mid-2014. This produced a sharp decline in SSA’s Terms of Trade 
(TOT) and curtailed significantly the ability of the governments to maintain their 
counter cyclical policy stance.  Oil and mineral exporting countries have started 
experiencing considerable strains in internal and external balances as well as sharp 
depreciation of their currencies. Several of them, including Ghana, had to turn to the 
IMF for its standard stabilisation package amid the fiscal and the debt crisis re-
emerging.   
 
This recent episode reaffirms the huge challenge facing African countries in 
implementing counter-cyclical stabilisation policy over commodity price cycles, in 
particular when they are hit by large negative shocks. In fact, success in countercyclical 
policies demands a high degree of fiscal discipline and institutional set-ups and capacity 
to manage resource rents over price cycles.15 For low-income, resource-poor countries, 
it is urgent to establish a global innovative facility, which guarantees an automatic 
access to financial assistance without policy conditionality, so that they could conduct 
counter-cyclical demand management to mitigate negative impacts of external 
shocks.16 An application of sharp contractionary measures to curtail indiscriminately 
aggregate demand, which jeopardise long-term development goals, is hardly justifiable 
in low -income economies.   
 
In this context, we make a strong case that a resolution of the short-run trade-off 
between the two objectives should be sought by pursuing macroeconomic 
management with a two-pillar policy stance on enhancing both aggregate effective 
demand and supply capacities over time and through economic cycles. That is, first, 
macroeconomic policies should be explicitly designed to increase aggregate demand 
along an equitable growth path to engender a pro-poor, shared growth. Second, they 
should be designed to sustain pro-investment macro conditions throughout cycles, so 
                                                        
13 See, for example, Kasekende et.al, (2010). 
14 Kasekende et al (2010) cite Angola, Botswana and Nigeria among oil exporting countries, which used 
reserves to cushion the initial impacts of the GFC. A number o frontier economies such as South 
Africa, Mauritius and Kenya implemented  fiscal expansion. 
15 For example, see Chile’s more successful experience. It adopted Structural Fiscal Balance policy in 
2001 with a view to developing a cyclically-neutral fiscal policy, where current expenditure is 
stabilized by linking to the structural level of fiscal income (Ffrench-Davis, 2010) 
16 See Nissanke and Kuleshov (2013) for detailed proposals for the innovative global facilities involving 
incentive-compatible aid and debt contracts.   
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that supply constraints could be reduced in combination with other policy tools that aim 
at building an economy’s productive and absorptive capacity. Naturally, increasing 
aggregate demand and supply capacity is at heart of what economic development is 
about. However, in our view these policy commitments are also highly relevant to 
serving the stabilisation needs. 
 
Here, two justifications can be offered in support of our propositions: i) macroeconomic 
stabilisation as conceived by Keynes entails, above all, the sustaining aggregate 
demand close to a full employment level throughout business cycles. For developing 
countries with abundant unemployed resources, this implies policies aiming at 
enhancing aggregate demand over time and sustaining efforts over cycles: ii) Combined 
with market excess created by euphoria at the advent of boom, developing economies 
experience overheating resulting from excess in aggregate demand over supply often 
due to sector-specific bottlenecks at the supply side and inadequate absorptive capacity 
at large.17  Hence, the focus on increasing supply and absorptive capacity can constitute 
an important stabilisation policy. Given limited resources, it is vital to coordinate 
investments to address critical supply constraints selectively and sequentially. This can 
be achieved if all policies are placed in a unified development strategic plan, wherein 
the two objectives are given due attention in an integrated manner.18 Stabilisation is 
then addressed through operationalised action plans in coordination with other policy 
tools, specifically with reference to medium- to long-term development objectives. 
 
Admittedly, it takes a long lead-time for supply constraints to be addressed, because 
both sector-specific and economy-wide productive investments involve a considerable 
gestation period. Meanwhile, excess demand over supply in key sectors can give rise 
to high inflation environments that require short-run stabilisation measures. However, 
an application of standard stabilisation entailing a severe suppression of aggregate 
demand would not be effective in arresting the inflation trends arising from supply 
constraints. Cost-push inflation led by high food prices prevalent in many developing 
countries is a case in point, as discussed below in Section 3.2.1. Instead, by focusing 
on increasing aggregate demand and supply capacity firmly as a guiding principle, 
short-run stabilisation measures should be conducted counter-cyclically to sources of 
instability, and applied primarily to tame market excess by prudential regulatory 
measures. Accepting our propositions necessitate a radical mindset shift in 
macroeconomic policy making, calling for challenging the conventional policy making 
as molded over the last four decades or so, as detailed in 2.2 below. 
 
2.2 Cross-cutting Agenda for Macroeconomic Policies  
 
                                                        
17 See Nissanke (2010c). 
18  Botswana has conducted countercyclical stabilisation policies in the planning framework since 
independence. Partly thanks to the uniqueness of its main export commodity, diamond, it was much 
less exposed to large negative shocks and avoided the debt crisis, and the heavy dose of the SAPs, 
which made it possible to maintain its successive National Development Plans as a system of guiding 
its socio-economic development. Botswana’s success story is often attributed to its developmental 
institutions (Robinson and Persons, 2006) and highly praised macroeconomic management, though 
it has been rather slow in diversifying its economic structures.  
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Set in the proposed framework, macroeconomic policy should address agenda 
transcending across several policy instruments. These cross-cutting agenda are 
interrelated, requiring a balancing act and a strategic use of instruments. We discuss 
them under five headings as indicated in Fig.2.  
 
1) Scaling up public investments and public goods provision in a fiscal sustainable 
manner with a view to changing Africa’s revealed comparative advantages 
 
Africa at its stage of development requires a “big push” – a surge in productive 
investments at nation-state, region and continent levels for reducing large deficits in 
human resources and infrastructure, and inducing a change to Africa’s revealed 
comparative advantage in the shortest possible time frame. In particular, an initial 
scaling up public investment is required to create positive externalities and address 
other forms of market failures. Without committed public investments, private 
investments would not come on board on a self-sustained basis to create opportunities 
and jobs for growing young population in an all-inclusive manner. Hence, 
macroeconomic policies should be consistently pro-public investment and pro-public 
goods provision towards building a foundation for a well-articulated, diversified 
economy and an inclusive society. Naturally, such a scaling up should be conducted in 
a financially sustainable manner, for which building a solid institutional foundation 
takes a primacy, as discussed below.  Further, the scaling up should be planned in light 
of an economy’s absorptive capacity, which itself should increase as a country starts 
reaping returns from productive investments.  
 
2) Coordinating investment by embedding macroeconomic policy alongside other 
policies in a long- term development planning framework 
 
Public investment using scarce resources should be made selectively, sequenced 
purposely, directed towards achieving the highest social and societal returns, i.e. the 
highest developmental dividends in the long run.  For this, overall investment activities, 
both public and private, should be well coordinated across sectors in a big push with 
aggregate demand spillovers to facilitate “a move from a bad to a good equilibrium” 
(Murphy et. al (1989).  Markets as institutions are characterized by coordinaten failure 
if left to their own device.  One of the main functions of the strategic planning 
framework is to coordinate investments in a big push. Therein, the core remit of 
macroeconomic policies is to deliver pro-investment macro conditions so that a host of 
other policies could address key supply constraints sequentially and in coordination 
with each other. For this to happen all macroeconomic tools- fiscal, monetary and 
financial policies – should be pursued in an internally consistent and mutually 
reinforcing manner in support of other policy tools.  This requires developing a solid 
institutional capacity for coordination on the part of the government and public 
agencies. For market failure in coordination by itself cannot preclude a possibility of 
coordination failure on the part of public agencies.   
 
Now, for articulated economic structures to emerge in Africa, it is necessary to surpass 
a critical minimum threshold of the market size so that spatial externalities and 
agglomeration effects to take hold. Currently, the size of home market of most African 
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countries individually is too small, largely due to the low level of per capita income, 
while 20 countries are also small in its population with less than 6 million. The small 
size of the domestic market poses a real impediment to building an articulated economy 
with dynamic externalities and spillovers on the basis of scale economies required for 
high-value added activities. Therefore, regional integration is a logical option to follow, 
as larger regional markets would present each member country with the potential of a 
real ‘win-win’ outcome from the formation of common markets and internal demand 
spillovers. Regional cooperation and policy coordination is vital so that Africa could 
enlarge market sizes collectively on the basis of augmented effective aggregate demand 
from rising per-capita income and consumption spillovers.   
 
3) Maintaining macro stability for forward-looking investments through alleviating 
supply bottlenecks and taming market excess  
 
Structural transformation cannot be realized by public investments alone. Public 
investment is necessity for public goods provision as well as a means to animate private 
actors and crowd-in larger private investment. Private agents are strategic actors and 
partners to advance structural transformation. To entice rigorous private investment, 
maintaining macroeconomic stability is essential.  Unstable macro conditions generate 
high uncertainty and risks, which would prevent private agents from making forward-
looking productive investments. At the same time harsh fiscal retrenchments and overly 
restrictive monetary policies, aimed at attaining ‘macro stability’ at almost any cost, is not 
capable of advancing the transformation agenda. A fresh approach to attaining 
stabilisation is imperative. 
 
As stated earlier, in the traditional Keynesian paradigm, pursuing stabilisation is meant 
to be a carefully treading the short-run trade-off between the growth and stabilisation 
objectives. In navigating a dynamic path to achieve macroeconomic balances in the 
short-run, the rule advanced by Jan Tinbergen was used to be the first reference point 
in macroeconomic policy making. It postulates that policy makers require the same 
number of policy instruments as policy targets.19 Yet, the stagflation episode of the 
1970s gave rise to the ‘New Classical Counter Revolution’ in macroeconomics. 
Macroeconomic policy making based on the Keynesian models was replaced with the 
one built on the ‘microfounded macromodels’ that incorporate ‘rational expectations’, 
the ‘expectations-augmented Philips curve’ and other restrictive assumptions such as 
the efficient market hypothesis and ‘optimizing agents’.20 The ‘real business cycle 
theory’ emerged from this class of macromodels postulates that economic cycles are 
attributable only to technology shocks, not to aggregate demand fluctuations. Given 
this, macroeconomic management is claimed to tame the business cycle by containing 
inflation and stabilising output, but not to raise the output level over time.21 Price 
                                                        
19 This thesis is further popularlised in the Swan diagram that is used to be the standard tool-kit in 
macroeconomic management of a Keynesian tradition. 
20 See Vines and Wills (2018) and Wren-Lewis (2018). 
21 See Blanchard and Summers (2017) for a summary of the evolution of macroeconomic policy thinking 
since the 1970s. Vines and Wills (2018) offer a useful contour of the evolution of macroeconomic 
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stability has become almost a synonym with macro stability, and monetary policy has 
been given a primacy over fiscal policy in macroeconomic management.  
 
However, more recently, this ‘microfoundation hegemony’ in macroeconomics has 
been subject to scrutiny. The exclusive use of one single monetary policy instrument 
for stabilisation as in the case of the Inflation Targeting regime, had to be critically 
reappraised as an afterthought of the GFC of 2008-9.22 In its immediate aftermath, 
policy makers globally were forced to resort to a large fiscal stimulus package to 
attenuate the impact of the GFC and save the global economy from descending into a 
deep depression. However counter arguments against the use of fiscal stimulus were 
launched almost straightway in favour of fiscal austerity and debt stabilisation.23 Yet, 
the extended period of weak recovery from the GFC, now increasingly referred to as 
the Great Recession, has again led to another round of the academic debates on 
macroeconomic theory and policy.24   
 
Drawing attention to the prolonged recessionary environments stuck in the “secure 
stagnation” equilibrium characterized by low output-productivity growth as well as low 
inflation, low interest rates and stagnant real wages coupled with the lower bound on 
nominal interest rates in advanced economies, a growing number of macroeconomists 
challenge the pre-crisis consensus, i.e. the exclusive use of monetary policy for 
stabilisation purpose as practiced before the GFC.  They suggest: i) fiscal policy should 
be given a much more active role in stabilisation; ii) debt consolidation should take 
place more slowly and the discussion of debt sustainability must be revisited; and iii) 
there is a strong case for increased debt-financed public investment.25 
 
Our quick excursion of the academic debates unfolded in macroeconomic theory and 
policy making since the 1970s attests the risk of uncritically basing macroeconomic 
management of developing economies on the theories and policymaking rules 
advanced for developed economies. To start with, macroeconomic theory was first 
conceived from the necessity to minimise short run fluctuations of economic activities 
of developed economies, not to ‘raise output level over time’. Further, even this short-
run mission has been confined narrowly to the one aiming at price stability at the cost 
of downplaying the need for sustaining aggregate demand over business cycles. This 
dominant thinking in macroeconomics prevailed before the GFC has been inevitably 
challenged, since it failed not only in crisis prevention but also in effecting crisis 
management to steer economies out of the Great Recession.  
 
                                                        
theory since the 1930s and discuss the future directions in macroeconomic model building beyond 
the benchmark DSGE model.   
22  See our discussion in Section 3.2 below. 
23 . This was played out in the heated debates over the direction of causality in the debt-growth nexus 
between Krugman as a prominent Keynesian and Rogoff and Reinhurt in the opposing camp.   
24  See Stiglitz (2014), Blanchard and Summers (2017) and the papers included in the special issues of 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy on “rebuilding macroeconomic theory”, Volume 34, No.1-2. 
25 Blanchard and Summers (2017). 
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In developing countries, tasks assigned to macroeconomic management are even more 
demanding than just aggregate demand management aiming at stabilizing output over 
business cycles as in developed economies. As discussed earlier, macroeconomic 
policies for structural transformation should accomplish two objectives of stabilisation 
and development simultaneously. This calls for a radical change in mindset regarding 
how to go about making macroeconomic management to overcome disjuncture 
between the two objectives. In this context, we emphasised above the need to focus on 
comprehensive measures that could enhance aggregate demand and aggregate supply 
capacity over time and through cycles. With a skillful application of all macroeconomic 
policy tools in a coherent manner, stabilisation policies should focus on taming excess 
in market forces by prudential regulations and other policies with a view to reducing 
high volatility associated with speculation that engender more uncertain environments. 
What is needed is a development-focused approach to stabilisation, which could 
contribute to, rather than backtrack, structural transformation agenda.  
 
4) Mobilising resources from stable sources for development finance and reducing aid 
dependence over time 
 
The scaling up of productive investments requires stable financial resources of 
considerable size. In this context, newly available financial instruments for mobilizing 
private savings have attracted attention as source for financing Africa’s development, 
in particular for closing its vast infrastructure gap. Among them, there are instruments 
specially targeted at global investors who can bear high currency and country risks in 
their quest for very higher returns, including sovereign bonds in hard currencies, private 
equity funds or other vehicles.26 A dozen countries have issued sovereign bonds in 
international capital markets since 2007 for financing infrastructure development or 
refinancing.27 Private Equity Funds (PEFs) with access to a variety of resources held 
by private or institutional investors operating globally have also become active in 
countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya.  
 
Though these new opportunities have been embraced with enthusiasm in Africa, a 
careful appraisal is due whether they are suitable as development finance at this stage 
of African development.28 For example, not only do bonds issued in hard currencies 
carry considerable currency risk, but they are much more expensive compared with 
concessional borrowing in yields, spreads and other contractual terms. Further, among 
debt instruments, bonds can be more expensive for infrastructure financing compared 
with loan contracts tailored for specific projects. Although the cost at the time of issuing 
was not viewed as prohibitively high under the historically low interest rates prevailed 
globally, there is always a risk of escalating costs, as soon as interest rates start edging 
                                                        
26 See  Beck et al. (2011). 
27 Ghana’s sovereign bond issue of $750 million in 2007 for financing energy and infrastructure projects 
attracted lots of publicity at the time. This enticed other countries such as Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Rwanda and Kenya to follow. Yet it is worth noting Ghana had to go back for refinancing its original 
bonds.  
28  Equally, a careful assessment is required before embracing uncritically the use of ‘blended finance’ 
as development finance, which has been strongly advocated by the donor community more recently.  
This is the accepted version of an article that has been published by Elsevier in Structural Change and 
Economic Dynamics on 18 Aug 2018. Published version available from: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2018.07.005 
Accepted version made available under CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International License from SOAS Research 
Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/26304/  
   
15 
up and investors’ risk appetites shift abruptly. Therefore, raising funds through 
sovereign bonds issues in international markets carries high risks and costs (currency 
risk, refinancing risk and interest rate risk among others). The history of sovereign debt 
restructuring processes is littered with difficult and costly negotiations, and orderly 
workout mechanisms are yet to establish. Restructuring sovereign bonds with private 
holders can be a lengthy and costly exercise at times of payment difficulties. Further, 
global investors participating in PEFs demand some of the highest risk premium for 
investing in Africa due to high-risk perception.  In the process, they can make asset 
prices unrealistically high by competitive bidding in relation to returns that could be 
reasonably expected from real investments.  
 
Hence, development finance should be vigorously sought first from more stable sources 
of funding by tapping domestic savings or overseas investors firmly committed to 
African development such as SWFs or remittances or diaspora’s contributions to 
development finance.29 For this, as discussed later in Section 3.2, it is necessary to have 
financial policies in place to entice domestic financial institutions and markets to 
overcome their operational hindrances and serve as a reliable source of development 
finance. 
 
Turning to sources for financing public investment, it is critical to develop and secure 
a stable domestic revenue base. Foreign aid flows to Africa have been very volatile and 
unpredictable. Further, the past experiences show that aid is often made available with 
a set of intrusive ‘policy conditionality’ that reduce the space of ‘home-grown’ policy 
making. Public finance cannot be overly dependent chronically on foreign aid. In the 
past, many African countries have suffered from a rather unhealthy “aid-dependence” 
syndrome that is detrimental to their ‘nation-state’ building efforts.30 Though fragile, 
post-conflict countries would remain aid-dependent for their budgetary operations for 
foreseeable future, it is high time for many African countries to plan a concrete path 
leading to graduation from aid dependence, by consolidating their own domestic and 
regional revenue basis through building a robust tax system and arresting illicit 
financial outflows.  
 
5) Securing fiscal sustainability by establishing fiscal legitimacy through institutional 
transformation 
 
Securing fiscal sustainability takes primacy in attaining both developmental and 
stabilisation objectives. The surge in public expenditure and investment cannot be 
planned and implemented in a fiscally fragile environment. An escalation of fiscal 
deficits in an unsustainable manner would results in macro instability that would 
undermine efforts to sustain productive investments.  There is an urgency to develop 
the capacity of prudent and efficient public finance management. Furthermore, the 
transformation of economic structures and social orders requires a specific institutional 
                                                        
29 According to World Bank (2014), 1) diaspora saving from SSA reached US$37 billion in 2012; 2) 
officially recorded remittance flows to SSA was US $32 billion in 2013, Nigeria alone accounting 
for US $21 billion. 
30 See Nissanke (2010b) and Nissanke and Shimomura (2013). 
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configuration. In particular, for advancing Africa’s ambitious transformation agenda, a 
strong coalition between the government and domestic stakeholders/actors is essential.  
In fact, a country’s institutional configuration is the outcome of the intense public-
private interface as political and economic institutions interact.31  
 
In this specific context, we argue that fiscal sustainability can be truly secured in a 
medium- to long-run, when fiscal legitimacy is firmly built on the basis of strategic 
interplays between the government and private agents for development through creating a 
virtuous circle in the public goods provision-taxation nexus, as discussed below. The 
scaling up of public investments and public goods provision requires a consolidation of 
tax revenues on a stable basis. This could be achieved when private agents are assured that 
their government is accountable to them and it serves their collective interests.  For this, 
the quality of governance at all levels of public institutions should be significantly 
improved by rooting out corruptive practices that have led to large scale illicit financial 
outflows from the continent to date.  In short, Africa requires institutional transformation 
towards building a developmental nation-state, which keenly recognises the centrality of 
the taxation-public goods provision nexus for realizing its vision of transformation of 
economic and social structures. 
 
3. Making Macroeconomic Policies Work for Structural Transformation  
 
3.1. Achieving Fiscal Sustainability by Establishing Legitimacy- An Institutional 
Analysis of Fiscal Policies  
 
Building robust institutions for distribution, coordination, collective action and conflict 
resolution as a nation state is of critical importance for advancing Africa’s 
transformation agenda. How fiscal policy is conducted makes an enormous difference 
to the process of a nation-state building, as fiscal instruments do serve as an essential 
institutional conduit for resource allocation to address issues regarding distribution, 
redistribution and conflict resolution as well as for mobilizing resources as collective 
action. That is, through fiscal policy action, a government fulfills its pivotal dual role 
of providing public goods on the expenditure side and mobilizing resources through 
consolidating a tax system on the revenue side. As such, the public goods provision-
taxation nexus constitutes an implicit unified social contract between the government 
and domestic stakeholders.  
 
Whilst macroeconomic policy discourses are often conducted with reference only to 
the state of fiscal balances in net for evaluating fiscal performances, an integrated 
approach to the two sides of fiscal balances - revenue and expenditure- is required to 
shed a light on how to make fiscal policy conducive to structural transformation. In this 
context, an agency-theoretic analysis discusses how the public-private interface can 
evolve through the fiscal policy space. For example, defining a government as a 
strategic agent maximizing its fiscal revenues, Aoki et al. (1996: 17) note that “whether 
government chooses to act as a predator or as a promoter of the private sector depends 
critically on the quality of its tax apparatus. … A revenue-maximising government with 
                                                        
31 See Nissanke (2017a) 
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a poor tax apparatus will always choose to act as a predator”. He suggests that in order 
to restrain government from acting as a predator, a nation state should be equipped with 
a high-quality tax collection apparatus and an information-processing capability. 
Otherwise, with their weak tax base, a predatory state holds up private agents to extract 
extra income as much as possible from them. 32  In response to such government 
behaviour, private firms and rural households refrain from making risky but high return 
investments on their own unless assured that they can keep a substantial portion of 
returns.  
 
At the expenditure side, if divisive instruments such as subsidies or preferential credits 
are used just as mechanisms to buy political support or to appease various interest 
groups, governments could become hostage to their narrow political support base. This 
is typically observed in a collusive state, wherein the government colludes with 
particular private agents for its advantage (Aoki, 2001, Chapter 6). Over time divisible 
benefits distributed to finance political costs could constitute a heavy burden on public 
finance. Distributive conflicts, though inherent in any society, can be exacerbated in 
this kind of state by the proliferation of patron-client relationships and patronage arising 
from the perverse use of fiscal instruments in such a manner. There is a risk of 
descending to predatory states.  
 
Aoki’s thesis may help explain some of the fiscal impasses observed in Africa. 
Politicians sitting in autocratic governments of natural resource-rich countries may 
have lacked the incentive to develop an efficient tax system for engaging with domestic 
stakeholders, as they could access resource rents to their personal benefits in non-
transparent dealings with foreign oil or mining companies. Further, African 
governments in the early decades were criticized for their urban bias in public 
expenditures at the cost of agricultural development and their failure to undertake pro-
poor investment in rural areas. This is in a contrast to the earlier experiences of several 
East Asian economies, where the pro-poor pattern of public expenditure in favour of 
the rural poor together with redistribution of productive assets such as land at early 
stages of development produced the ‘shared’ growth process for some time before 
globalization forces have given rise to growing inequality.33  The IFI-sponsored SAPs 
in the 1980s and 1990s, which were supposed to address Africa’s previous institutional 
gridlocks, left governments with drastically reduced resources and capabilities, 
dysfunctional as an effective provider of essential public goods to domestic 
stakeholders.  
 
The absence of reliable provision of public goods kept a significant proportion of 
private agents away from the "official" economy. The largely informal economy 
leading to a weak and narrow tax base reinforced the fiscal fragility. Thus, the poor 
provision of public goods and the fragile fiscal condition kept its own loop of vicious 
                                                        
32 In Aoki (2001 and 2007), a government is defined as a strategic player of the game in the political 
domain under the rule of the game, i.e. institutions. In contrast, a state is defined as “a stable order of 
relationships between the government and private agents in the political domain”. He suggests different 
prototypes of the “state” exist, such as democratic, collusive and predatory.  
33 See Nissanke and Thorbecke (2008 and 2010) for more discussions.  
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circle of condemning the economy to a low equilibrium, leading to a fragile state with 
a reduced institutional capability to function. Fiscal fragility accompanied by sharp 
retrenchments is known to aggravate distributional tensions and conflicts in a society 
fractured along ethnical and/or linguistic lines. Therefore, without attending to such an 
institutional trap, little progress could be made in nation-state building through 
mobilising energy and resources of people for commonly shared developmental 
objectives. Democracy cannot work in an institutional vacuum. As Aoki (2001) notes, 
institutional configurations for supporting the democratic state as a stable self-
enforcing equilibrium can emerge only through active interface between the 
government and private agents/domestic stakeholders. 
 
It is imperative, from this institutional perspective, to secure fiscal sustainability and 
legitimacy by engaging with domestic stakeholders through high quality public goods 
provision while building a solid domestic revenue base. This would in turn bring about 
double dividends: i) breaking out from the vicious circle of fiscal fragility, resulting 
from the cumulative causation of poor public goods provision and a weak tax base; and 
ii) building an institutional foundation for transparency and accountability in public 
finance management towards domestic stakeholders. With increased credibility in 
providing public goods and undertaking rigorous investments in basic economic and 
social infrastructures, underpinned with prudent and disciplined management of public 
resources, domestic stakeholder’s readiness to contribute towards tax revenues would 
increase.   
 
What is required is a solid institutionalised fiscal mechanism for productive dialogues 
between policy-makers and domestic stakeholders with a view to enhancing collective 
efforts in building a developmental state whilst creating a diversified portfolio of 
productive assets. The historically observed high dependence of African governments 
on foreign aid for their development finance and policy formation has seriously 
undermined the progress toward building a developmental ‘nation state’ as a facilitator 
of structural transformation.  To trigger the process of virtuous circle, aid should be 
made available for developing a home-grown institutional configuration conducive to 
structural transformation without intrusive policy conditionality.34
 
 
In short, the issues of fiscal sustainability should be examined by taking an integrated 
approach to both sides of fiscal balance. This means establishing fiscal legitimacy in 
the eyes of domestic stakeholders. The majority of stakeholders in Africa are the 
voiceless poor, who can be brought effectively into a country’s developmental mission, 
only if they are assured of a fair and transparent fiscal mechanism of distributing rents 
for advancing their socio-economic needs. Towards this end, fiscal policies should aim 
at: 1) broadening domestic revenue bases with enhanced and sustained provision of 
high quality public goods so that domestic stakeholders feel tangible returns from their 
tax contributions to fiscal revenue; 2) enhancing tax revenues through improved 
governance to stem cross border illicit financial flows and strengthening negotiating 
positions with transnational corporations and foreign investors in interests of domestic 
                                                        
34  See Nissanke and Shimomura (2013) discuss the role of aid as handmaiden for institutional 
development. 
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stakeholders; 3) having a clear roadmap of how to change Africa’s revealed 
comparative advantage by turning natural resource wealth into productive assets 
through pro-poor fiscal expenditures; and 4) establishing a counter-cyclical inter-
temporal allocation of resource rents and sovereign debt management embedded in a 
well-run system of public finance management with transparency and accountability to 
all parties.35 
 
3.2. Making Monetary and Financial Policies Conducive to Africa’s Structural 
Transformation Agenda 
3.2.1 Reappraisal of Contemporary Discourse on the Monetary Policy Regime in 
Arica’s context 
Given the monetary policy dominance in macroeconomic management where 
achieving price stability is seen as its sole purpose, the scope of conventional monetary 
policy discourses has become narrow, with a focus on the choice between the two 
regimes – the aggregate monetary targeting and the inflation targeting (IT).  Reflecting 
the dominant literature in monetary policy conducts for some time, manifesting in the 
pronouncement of the ‘Great Moderation’ by Bernanke in 2004 to mark the 
achievement of reducing the volatility of business cycle fluctuations, it was claimed 
before the GFC that the efficacy of macroeconomic management is almost exclusively 
found in the adoption of the IT regime as a universal solution for ensuring macro 
stability.  
 
The IT has gained popularity worldwide as a superior regime for its simplicity: there is 
only a single target and a single instrument – the interest rate. The rule-based decision-
making under the IT regime is thought of overcoming ‘time inconsistency’ problem 
arising out of dynamic interface/feedback loops between policies and private agents’ 
expectations. This property is presumed to allow simpler communication to the public, 
because the IT regime is seen to provide a credible, rule-based anchor in formation of 
inflation expectation of agents operating in financial markets. The IT regime is claimed 
to provide a single “magic wand” for ensuring macro stability by reducing volatility in 
both output and inflation rate.36 
 
Central banks in Africa have long used reserve-money programmes for their monetary 
policy in which the balance sheet operations are the instrument, whilst the base money 
is the operational target and broader monetary aggregates as their intermediate targets. 
Recently, however, many central bankers have been attracted to the IT regime and its 
rule-based simplicity. South Africa was the first to adopt it. With the IMF’s technical 
support, others such as Ghana and Kenya, where there are relatively deeper financial 
markets - a precondition for a successful operation of the IT regime - followed suit.  
However, a question remains whether the IT regime is appropriate as a single 
instrument for achieving macro stability, let alone the twin objectives of stabilisation 
                                                        
35  See Nissanke (2014) for detailed discussions on these measures.  
36 There are some variations in the mandate given to the Central Bank as well as in its operation. Central 
banks of emerging market economies such as Brazil have instituted an “exit” route of  discretionary 
nature in the light of a greater effect of exchange rate movements on monetary stability, without 
having the exchange rate as a target. 
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and development. Importantly, the suitability and effectiveness of the IT regime is not 
discussed in the light of the predominant nature of inflation in Africa– the cost-push 
inflation, which has disproportionately large effects on the livelihood of both the rural 
and the urban poor. 
 
Meanwhile, the onset of the GFC forced a critical evaluation of the original version of 
the IT regime for its failure to detect the fragility developing in financial systems and 
markets. This has led to a post-crisis consensus, suggesting: 1) the list of targets must 
include financial stability, in addition to macro stability; 2) the single policy rate 
instrument cannot achieve both targets - financial and monetary stability; and 3) the 
link between inflation stability and the output gap is much less tight than previously 
assumed. Hence, the policy rate cannot achieve macro stability, as it cannot reduce 
volatility in output as well as in prices.37  Clearly, the central banks should not be 
content with a single-minded focus on keeping inflation stable but in engaging with the 
question how to make sure that inflation target is not pursued at cost of low growth and 
high unemployment.  
 
As a result of reappraisal, the IT regime, which was seen a neat solution to macro 
stability before the GFC, has been evolving into a regime with multiple objectives and 
targets, on the one hand, and more policy tools, on the other, in the post-crisis debate.  
In addition, the central banks of advanced countries have been forced to resort to 
unconventional monetary policy tools such as the Quantitative Easing to overcome the 
Liquidity Trap.  Indeed, trapped in the recession and stagnation since the GFC, most of 
the central banks are forced to keep policy rates near or below zero in order to emerge 
from recession or feeble growth.  
 
If the IT regime is not a panacea in advanced economies, it cannot be a magic solution 
to multiple objectives facing developing countries. To begin with, neither the IT regime 
nor the aggregate monetary target regime could be a solution to cost-push inflation in 
developing countries where high inflation is not necessarily just a monetary 
phenomenon and often associated with escalating prices of basic wage goods such as 
food and fuel.38 The latter stems from domestic supply shocks or high import prices 
often following on large currency depreciations. Cost-push inflation of this kind 
requires policies that address supply-side factors such as crop failures or attend volatile 
currency movements in light of the high ‘pass-through rate’ from world prices to 
domestic inflation rates. Furthermore, in low-income economies, where capital markets 
are in their infancy, and the use of informal finance is widespread, the efficacy of 
conventional monetary instruments for controlling inflation is much less due to weaker 
transmission channels through formal financial systems.   
 
Clearly, an appropriate policy regime cannot be sought in a simple emulation to the one 
that may have appeared to work elsewhere. If monetary policy is tightened in response 
                                                        
37 See, for example, Blanchard (2012) and Blanchard and Summers (2017). 
38  For example, Adam et.al (2012) show that headline inflation in Tanzania is largely driven by highly 
volatile agricultural outputs, caused by rain-fed nature of agriculture but exacerbated by spatially 
fragmented agricultural domestic markets and inadequate storage facilities.   
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to supply shocks that have inflationary consequences, a policy response entailing  a 
contraction in aggregate demand is pro-cyclical. Such a stance runs the risk of 
worsening the economic impacts of negative shocks. Surely, a strict inflation targeting 
with an exclusive focus on maintaining low inflation and limiting the expansion of 
domestic credit is inappropriate in many cases, calling for alternative approaches, so 
that monetary policy can be pro-investment and pro-employment orientated, in support 
of Africa’s structural transformation.39 
 
3.2.2 Positioning in a Space of Macroeconomic Policy Trilemma for Taming 
Financial Excess  
Macro stability cannot be achieved by domestic monetary policy of any kind in its 
isolation in the context of ‘small open economies’, which are constantly exposed to 
large external shocks, both real and financial. Frequent abrupt TOT changes originating 
from commodity markets are the most significant real shocks for many African 
economies, while highly volatile exchange rates and cross-border capital flows 
characterized as ‘hot money’ can derail stabilisation efforts by overwhelming 
macroeconomic imbalances. The latter situation can be better illustrated with reference 
to the thesis of ‘Macroeconomic Policy Trilemma’, as shown in Fig.3. 40  This 
proposition, which is also known as the Impossible Trinity thesis, can be used to 
evaluate explicitly the choice of the domestic monetary policy regime in conjunction 
with management of exchange rates and cross-border capital flows in a more integrated 
manner. It stipulates policymakers in open economies face a trilemma: whilst 
policymakers have three desirable objectives (exchange rate stability, free international 
capital mobility, and monetary policy independence to engage with domestic economic 
goals), they are forced to give up one objective, since only two out of the three can be 
mutually consistent. Resorting to this thesis, it has been argued that the only exchange 
rate regimes that remain viable in an era of free cross-border capital mobility are the 
two corner positions within the trinity, i.e. either pure floating or hard pegs, referred to 
as the two-corner view on the exchange rate regime.41 
 
-Insert Figure 3 about here- 
 
However, this dominant position is entirely driven by the imperative of financial 
globalisation, which itself has been questioned in the aftermath of the GFC.  The 
arguments rest on the assumption that financial openness alone should not be challenged 
in the trinity, either because of the large benefits that financial openness is promised to 
produce, or because free capital mobility is inevitable due to changes in global technology, 
market structures or politics. While the thesis applies to any open economy, the policy 
                                                        
39 For example, Heintz and Pollin (2008) suggest that given the relatively high thresholds at which 
inflation starts exerting negative effects on growth in developing economies, the excessive contractionary 
bias in monetary policies has stifled the growth of domestic firms and their ability to create gainful 
employments in Africa. In place of such monetary policies, they suggest adopting low short-term real 
interest rates as the operating targets of monetary policy as an employment-centered strategy.  
 
40 See Obstfeld (2015) for a recent exposition of this thesis.  
41  It is also known as the hollowing out hypothesis or the bi-polar view. 
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constraint posed is particularly severe for developing countries, reflecting their 
disadvantaged position in global finance. Their domestically issued notes are ‘soft’ in 
currency hierarchy, acting as an additional source of fragility. Their central banks cannot 
act as a ‘lender of last resort’ at times of crises.42  
 
Thus, the financial fragility of developing economies is related to their asymmetric 
position vis-à-vis advanced countries in international finance as well to their structural 
characteristics. As Bordo and Flandreau (2001) note, the degree of `financial maturity’ 
- the ability to issue international securities denominated in own currency - is a key 
factor in distinguishing `core’ countries from `periphery’ ones for exchange rate regime 
choices. The prevalence of their ‘Fear of Floating’ (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000) or ‘the 
Case of Hard Pegs’ (Calvo 2000) is also closely related to: i) liability dollarisation, i.e. 
the condition in which financial contracts are expressed in foreign currency; ii) fear of 
inflation due to the high pass-through coefficients (measurements of the speed of 
transmission of devaluation to inflation); and iii) their nascent capital markets. Despite 
the strong case made by many influential macroeconomists for the two-corner view, de 
facto intermediate regimes have proved the most prevailing in developing countries. 
It is in this context, the IT-cum–pure floating regime, which has gained popularity, should 
be evaluated. It is argued: 1) the credibility of the commitment to the IT regime is 
assured by the institutional arrangements of the central bank’s independence from 
political interferences and that this would ensure transparency and accountability for 
monetary stability; 2) this credible institutional commitment to the inflation targeting 
would provide a nominal anchor under a pure floating, superseding the argument for a 
fixed regime as a nominal anchor. That is, by adopting an IT regime and some variations 
of the Taylor Rule as a policy guide (Taylor 2001), the monetary stability is supposed 
to prevail under a pure floating system without having exchange rate-based stabilization 
in place. The popularity of the IT regime lies in the possibility of allowing to opt for a 
floating exchange rate regime in the context of the ‘impossible trinity’ in a world of 
free capital mobility.  
 
However, the impossible trinity thesis by itself does not imply that full financial 
integration should be pursued at any cost. It merely suggests the difficulty in achieving 
all the three objectives. As Frankel (1999) suggests, in theory, countries could position 
anywhere within the triangle:  they can opt for a half-independent monetary policy and 
a half-fixed exchange rate by adopting intermediate regimes such as a target zone; or 
they can have both an independent monetary policy and a stable or fixed exchange rate 
by imposing effective capital controls. The jury is still out on the question of an optimal 
combination of the exchange rate regime and the monetary policy regime under 
financial globalization. In practice, ‘fear of floating’ has been prevalent in developing 
countries, not only on account of the high ‘pass-through rates’ and the balance sheet 
effect as result of their increasing liability dollarization but also on account of frequent 
supply shocks and vulnerability to external shocks as in African countries. 
  
                                                        
42  Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) suggest developing economies are handicapped by the ‘original 
sin’ due to their incomplete domestic financial markets. 
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The dual role of exchange rate policy in managing both external and internal balances 
means a trade-off between flexibility and stability in the choice of the exchange rate 
regime. The real target approach to an appropriate exchange rate policy focuses on the 
developmental needs to keep competitiveness of tradable goods so as to ensure a viable 
and sustainable position in the current account, while the nominal anchor approach 
emphasizes the need to ensure monetary stability through keeping currency fluctuation 
limited. For many African countries, increasing the competitiveness of newly emerging 
tradable goods in both domestic and foreign markets and developing non-traditional 
exports is crucial in efforts to diversify trade structure away from the commodity-
dependence and the vulnerability associated with it. Indeed, it is in this context that 
Rodrik (2011) views the policy of undervalued currencies as a key developmental 
policy tools for structural transformation while eschewing both market and government 
failures.  
 
As integration into international capital markets of African economies has recently 
intensified, policymakers should take a critical, forward-looking position in a number 
of the issues raised in the ‘Trilemma’  debate. In this context, it is important to take a 
note of the conclusion reached by Rey (2013) after examining the nature of 
international capital flows, engendering highly volatile global financial cycles. She 
suggests that the global financial cycle transforms the trilemma into a ‘dilemma’ or an 
‘irreconcilable duo’: independent monetary policies are possible if and only if the 
capital account is managed. Indeed, both equity and debt flows are highly volatile and 
pro-cyclical, increasingly driven by global liquidity cycles, resulting in sudden ‘surges 
and retrenchments’ (Forbes and Warnock 2012). Thus, mediated through high 
frequency trading, portfolio flows are ‘hot money’, driven by fast shifting in global 
investors’ liquidity preferences and risk appetites. Sudden changes in their self-
fulfilling expectations and market sentiment induce globally synchronised bubble-bust 
cycles in asset markets as well as credit conditions.  
 
These all point to the importance for African policymakers to conduct monetary policy in 
conjunction of managing an exchange rate trajectory and cross-border capital flows in a 
dynamic country-specific context with a view to reducing external sources of monetary 
instability. Africa’s structural transformation cannot be advanced when economies are 
exposed to additional financial shocks. It is necessary to monitor and screen cross-border 
capital flows on the basis of carefully weighing benefits and costs of different types of 
flows. 43  Further, beyond cross-border capital flow management, well-run regulatory 
systems should be in place for overseeing activities in financial markets and institutions 
with a view to taming financial ‘excess’ for counter-cyclical stabilisation purposes. 
Prudential financial regulations, both micro and macro measures, are necessary for 
market-based systems to function without causing havoc in real economic activities 
periodically and prevent crisis from developing in the first place.  
                                                        
43 After the GFC of 2008, there is a growing consensus that temporary capital controls are a legitimate part 
of the toolkit of macroeconomic management for developing economies (Ostry et al., 2010 and IMF 2012). 
In contrast, among others, Cooper (1999) argues for non-temporary controls on the importance of making 
the value of a country’s currency free from speculative movements of private capital and reducing both 
nominal and real exchange rate variability.  
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3.2.3 Securing Development Finance through strengthening domestic financial markets 
and institutions 
With increased cross-border capital flows, Africa’s liability-assets positions with the 
rest of the world and its debt profile/dynamics have been changing significantly. If these 
flows are deployed in productive investment with significant growth dividends, the 
capacity of absorbing capital flows and debt carrying capacity of African economies 
could be enhanced. Yet, one should bear in mind that international capital flows under 
the contemporary financial globalization is more of diversification finance conducted 
through asset swapping for risk hedging and shedding by financial investors to achieve 
maximum risk-adjusted returns to asset holders than development finance as such.  
 
Hence, rather than courting international investors excessively, policymakers’ focus 
should be on deepening domestic financial markets and strengthening the capacity of 
local financial institutions with a view to enhancing their role in development finance 
provision. In parallel with developing forward markets for domestic currencies, issuing 
debt instruments in domestic currencies can provide a necessary ‘learning’ space, so 
that liquid bond markets to emerge with a capacity to trade long-dated debt instruments 
by offering appropriate term structures. Domestic bond markets can aim at local 
investors and financial institutions, and those with firm commitments and interests 
aligned with Africa’s economic development such as diaspora. 44   They are more 
willing to take currency risks or other country risks associated with local-currency 
denominated instruments with a longer maturity.  
 
Naturally, developing their own deep, liquid markets are beyond the reach of smaller 
African countries. However, they can resort to regional capital markets in sub-regional 
‘hub’ countries to serve their financial needs for infrastructure development or 
financing cross-border infrastructure projects through regional cooperation. A few 
‘frontier’ markets economies have taken an initiative to cultivate domestic bond 
markets. For example, Kenya issued domestic bonds for infrastructure projects with a 
total value of US$ 1 billion in 2009/2010. This has subsequently paved the way to 
issuance of corporate bonds by both private and state-owned companies, including 
Safaricom (a mobile phone company) and KenGen (an electricity utility company). 
Additional incentive schemes instituted in conjunction with infrastructure bonds in 
Kenya are to allow bond holders to use the infrastructure bonds as collateral for 
accessing bank loans while banks can pledge them as collateral for their operation. This 
example shows that one right initiative can have the potential of creating a multiplier 
effect in development finance provision.  
 
In fact, the landscape of Africa’s financial systems has recently undergone a notable 
change. African-wide financial integration has been taking place through an increasing 
number of cross-border banking with an entry of regional and continental banks. At the 
same time, there have been efforts to address the poor’s access to financial services by 
the widespread diffusion of microfinance institutions (MFIs), and more recently micro 
insurances. The recent acceleration of ‘financial inclusion’ has also been facilitated 
                                                        
44  Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria issued diaspora bonds for infrastructure financing.  
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with application of new technology such as mobile banking and money services for 
transfers, payments and saving. For example, Kenya’s M-PESA has dramatically 
changed the modes of delivering financial services to low-income segments of 
population. Such mobile money services have now rapidly spread across Africa.  
 
While the recent progress in deepening financial markets and widening financial 
services is encouraging, this by itself is not enough. Historical experiences of late 
industrialised countries such as Germany, Japan and others show that financial 
institutions as a system in different shades did make a pivotal contribution to their 
success in achieving structural transformation within a short time span in their catching-
up processes.45  The pro-growth effects of finance are known to be greatest when 
economies are in the catching-up phase in their productivity levels with technology 
adoption and infusion. Finance is vital for unlocking production opportunities and 
providing support at critical stages of technology development and diffusion. Steady 
financial flows in support of productivity-enhancing investment and skill-technology-
knowledge acquisition into new dynamically evolving activities are essential for 
facilitating structural transformation while securing inclusiveness ex ante in 
developmental processes. Thus, finance can potentially play a vital role in accelerating 
the pace of structural transformation by providing appropriately structured products for 
domestic firms’ acquisition, adaptation and diffusion of technologies as well as the 
continuous development of their productive capabilities.  
 
In Africa, however, structural transformation processes have been impeded by the 
paucity of financial services for meeting the need of real sector development and 
transformative agenda.  While a continuum of financial products are under-supplied by 
financial systems, a ‘missing middle’ phenomenon in financial services should deserve 
more attention. The absence of financial institutions supporting productive investments 
and technological innovation of mid-sized enterprises may be particularly binding for 
facilitating transformation processes. Development of these enterprises is key for 
increasing value addition, technology acquisition, development and diffusion and their 
integration into global value chains and international trade. Critical financial gaps and 
mismatches are still acute and are hampering enterprise development, new and green 
technology diffusion and, ultimately, sustained economic growth. While secure 
working capital provision is critical for survival of SMEs, it is not sufficient for 
becoming a vehicle in their rapid expansionary paths.  
 
Africa’s banks, operating in environments characterized by high transaction costs and 
poor information flows, are still reluctant to extend loans to domestic firms, especially 
SMEs. The portfolios of most banks have been continuously dominated by ‘excess 
liquidity’, whereby banks prefer to hold assets predominantly in low risk-high return 
instruments with a short maturity such as treasury bills or central bank papers issued 
for a sterilization purpose.46 The high policy rates prevailing in Africa for controlling 
                                                        
45  For example, Aoki and Patrick (1994) and Teranishi (2000). 
46. See Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998 and 2006) and Saxegaard (2006) for discussions on the excess 
liquidity conditions, including causes and consequences.  
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inflation or sterilisation purposes has led to de facto crowded-out loans to SMEs. The 
lack of changes in these conditions explains the paucity of savings mobilisation efforts 
by banks and the 'low-lending trap' in the presence of latent excess demand for credit 
and loans. Further, high transaction costs and fragmented financial markets have kept 
interest spreads between deposit and loan rates very high, and the cost of obtaining bank 
credits and loans are often prohibitively high for most domestic firms. These 
operational constraints should be addressed so that financial institutions would play a 
vital role in financial intermediation to their full potential.  This prevailing condition 
also highlights the need for striking a better balance between the stabilisation and 
development objectives in conducting monetary policy so that domestic firms can have 
access to bank loans and credits at a reasonable cost, and their activities and investments 
are not starved off flows of funds.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
As a direct result of the interrelationships among macroeconomic frameworks, 
institutional configuration and development outcomes, the previously prevailed policy 
paradigms in sub-Saharan Africa failed to deliver structural transformation. Given the 
new landscape emerging at the backdrop of “Africa rising”, Africa is positioned at a 
historical juncture with new opportunities as well as formidable challenges in 
advancing its historical agenda of structural transformation. 47 Yet, the conventional 
macroeconomic policy discourse with an exclusive focus on maintaining macro 
stability in a low inflation environment is inadequate for the purpose of accelerating 
structural transformation of African economies. In the past, short-run stabilisation 
imperatives have largely driven practical agenda of macroeconomic management at the 
cost of suspending development efforts.  
 
This ‘think-piece’ outlined an alternative macroeconomic framework, wherein a 
resolution of short-run trade-offs between the two macroeconomic policy objectives- 
stabilisation and development- can be sought. We presented a case that macroeconomic 
policies should be placed in a development-centered planned framework, which would 
provide an anchor for navigating a path towards structural transformation. We 
emphasized that macroeconomic management, including stabilisation policies, should 
be consistently pursued with a two-pillar policy stance on enhancing both aggregate 
effective demand and supply capacities over time and through cycles by sustaining a 
positive feedback loop in the investment-growth nexus. Macroeconomic policies 
should consistently engage with the question how to increase aggregate demand along 
an equitable growth path to engender a pro-poor, shared growth. At the same time, they 
should strive for providing continuously pro-investment macroeconomic conditions so 
that other policies could alleviate supply constraints by building an economy’s 
productive and absorptive capacity.  
 
It is impossible to sustain the process of structural transformation with shrinking 
aggregate demand. A prolonged application of contractionary policies in the name of 
’stabilisation’ is universally detrimental to development, as aggregate effective demand 
would contract sharply. There is no justification of maintaining ‘austerity’ stance if 
                                                        
47 See Nissanke (2017b). 
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governments are equipped with a system of prudent public resource management while 
honestly engaged with structural transformation agenda. A disruption to the process of 
building productive and absorptive capacity should not be allowed in the name of 
stabilisation either. Instead, short-run stabilisation measures should be applied 
primarily to tame market excess by prudential regulations, exchange rate management 
and other policy tools, and conducted counter-cyclically to sources of instability and 
macro imbalances, correctly identified with a careful analytical assessment. Each of 
macroeconomic policy tools -fiscal, monetary and financial policies - should be 
executed in coordination so that they in aggregate could pursue the five cross-cutting 
policy agenda discussed in the paper. An appropriate policy regime cannot be found 
in a simple emulation to the one that may have appeared to work elsewhere. A radical 
shift of mindset, departing from the conventional macroeconomic policy debates, is 
required in our quest for alternative macroeconomic frameworks that can contribute 
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Fig.1. Africa’s Structural Transformation as Development Processes in the 21st Century 
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Fig. 3 Positioning in Macroeconomic Trilemma 
 
 
